I received last evening a report from a retired US Marine officer who just returned from Baghdad last Friday, June 13. It's rather lengthy so I won't just paste it here. Here is an excerpt summary of what he says.
- Baghdad is tense. The airport is extremely busy and flights elsewhere (especially to the Kurdish Region) are far overbooked. With the call to arms by Ayatollah Sistani, the prospect of a sectarian civil war is the highest it has ever been – and has the potential to even be worse than the 2006/2007 era.
- Media's portrayal of a relentless ISIS advance are incorrect. There has been no ISIS "blitzkrieg." The sensationalization of ISIS by the mainstream western media is the number one driving factor for the tension in Baghdad rather than a true appreciation of fact.
- The true facts need putting into context. Key points: Late May saw a substantial increase in insurgent activity across the country, bombings and attacks across the country, VBIEDs near Karbala and Najaf, an assassination of a senior Sahwa commander in Anbar, an assault on Sammara and finally the attack on Mosul which caused the rout of the Iraqi Army and everything that then subsequently unfolded. The key takeaways, however are:
- ISIS' "advance" from Mosul to the outskirts of Baghdad has been blown out of proportion. ISIS was masterful in capitalizing on their success in Mosul and then gaining and achieving momentum. But news of ISIS' Mosul success impelled a fleeing Iraqi Army to leave the Sunni dominated areas north of Baghdad. ISIS units already in place in Sunni areas mobilized all at once. Iraqi army commanders were the first to flee, which caused the mass pullout/desertion/withdrawal. ISIS then moved into the Iraqi Army positions, taking the majority of them without a fight or meeting only mediocre resistance.
- Extremely important to note: ISIS have yet to move outside of areas where they have always been traditionally strong. In addition, ISIS have met no resistance from the predominantly Sunni population in these areas. Also, ‘ISIS’ is not just ISIS. Other militant organizations and local Sunni tribes who are ‘going along with it for now’ are involved. These ultimately are not interested in the level of radicalism that true ISIS demands – so this is a fragile alliance at best, which will no doubt come to the fore once true resistance appears, or when ISIS start summarily executing people for crimes and issuing strict laws on how to live etc (and we are already seeing evidence of this in Mosul and Tikrit).
- Back to the ‘Advance on Baghdad’. ISIS have not yet set one foot outside areas where they have traditionally been strong, which is why the ‘advance’ has stalled in the area of Samarra/Balad. In Diyala with its more mixed populace, they have not even ‘advanced’ that far south in parallel – Shia militia groups such as AAH are openly fighting them and the Iraqi Army is maintaining a presence there also. ISIS is not successfully challenging the Kurds' Peshmerga militia, who are currently consolidating positions and expanding their region (they will likely be the ultimate winners in all of this).
- If ISIS steps off their traditional turf into areas where they have no popular support (i.e. Shia parts of the country – northern Baghdad for instance….) they will not do so well. Don't look for ISIS to threaten Baghdad anytime soon.
- Taji has become the main reception point for falling back troops and the point from where counter offensives will be planned and organized. On current available information, the massing troops there and the size of the facility means that ISIS as yet will have very little chance of attacking it in a conventional sense, so will get back to what they do best – car bombs, suicide attacks etc, along with IDF.
- It also goes for Baghdad itself. In Anbar to the west (and southwest of Baghdad) Iraqi army units have mostly withdrawn from Fallujah (presumably so properly battle hardened veterans can redeploy elsewhere). The has led to more freedom of movement for ISIS/anti govt elements – again with the implication of being able to stage closer to Baghdad. But we are talking about increased unconventional guerilla attacks in the capital a conventional assault.
- Baghdad is absolutely teeming with Iraqi Army troops and now, Shia milita of all kinds, including the now gloves-off Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) and Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH), and I don’t doubt (as with some other parts of the country) Iranian Quds force too. Iranian involvement is set to increase as this progresses.
- ISIS will not just stroll into Baghdad as they have in a similar fashion in the areas where they’ve always been strong. However, look for an increase in car bombings, suicide bombings, IDF threat to BIAP and IZ.
- The other major burning issue right now – is the mass Shia mobilization and the fighting that is to follow north of the capital: Once this begins, we are going to hear many reports of atrocities committed against both Sunni and Shia communities as such a mass, fast mobilization means that training will be poor as will discipline. And we already know what the other side is capable of. This has the very real potential to spark bitterness and a renewed civil war period. In Baghdad, this may well translate as mass sectarian killings on either side on the streets in capital in conjunction with attacks on Mosques etc (as happened in 2006/2007) depending as to what transpires over the coming days ..
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